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Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit Policy
and Hazardous Waste Compliance
Sarah Stafford*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final
policy, "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction,
and Prevention of Violations."' This policy, more commonly referred to as
the Audit Policy, is designed to encourage greater compliance with
environmental regulations by providing incentives for facilities to
voluntarily disclose and correct violations of environmental regulations.2
More specifically, the Audit Policy eliminates or reduces civil penalties for
violations that facilities disclose as the result of a documented self-audit
procedure and correct within 60 days.3 Additionally, regulators may choose
not to recommend criminal prosecution for these facilities.4 Repeated
violations, violations that present a "serious or imminent harm" to human
health and the environment,
or violations that involve criminal activity are
5
not covered by the policy.

Supporters of the Audit Policy argue that it is an "efficient and
economical means of ensuring and improving compliance with
environmental laws and regulations.",6 Opponents argue that this policy
ultimately protects polluters from punishment, and thus will have a
detrimental effect on the environment because facilities have less incentive
to comply. 7 Many who do not directly oppose the policy are nonetheless

skeptical about its ability to measurably affect compliance because of the
uncertain legal status of environmental audits, particularly whether the
results of the audit can be used against them in court. 8 The goal of this
* Associate Professor of Economics at the College of William & Mary. The author gratefully
acknowledges the financial support of Resources for the Future and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's Science to Achieve Results (STAR) program.
1. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of
Violations Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Audit Policy].
Minor revisions to the policy were issued under Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction, and Prevention of Violations Final Policy Statement, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11,2000).
2. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,706.
3. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
4. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
5. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
6. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Audit Policy Update: Spring 1999, available at
http ://www.epa.gov/oeca/apolguid.html.
7. See Richard Dahl, Audit-PrivilegeLaws: The Right to Know Nothing, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES (1999).

8. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement: Interim Guidance, 50 Fed. Reg. 46,504
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paper is to determine whether the Audit Policy has affected compliance
with hazardous waste regulations. The results of this analysis will provide
important feedback on the effectiveness of the Audit Policy. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
related literature on self-policing and compliance; Section 3 presents a
theoretical framework for this analysis; Section 4 discusses the empirical
approach and the results of the analysis; and Section 5 concludes.
II.

OVERVIEW OF SELF-POLICING AND RELATED LITERATURE

The term self-policing, as it is used in this paper, denotes a situation in
which a regulated entity notifies authorities that it has violated a regulation
or law. In comparison, the term self-reporting denotes a situation in which
a regulated entity provides authorities with information about its conduct
that does not necessarily include violating a regulation. For example,
EPA's regulations implementing the Clean Water Act require entities to
measure discharge levels and report them to EPA or the state regardless of
whether the emissions exceed specified discharge limitations. 9 In general,
self-reporting is a mandatory requirement and entities that are subject to it
face two decisions: (1) whether to self-report at all, and (2) whether to selfreport correctly.' 0 In contrast, self-policing is primarily voluntary and
involves only one key decision, whether or not to turn in one's self.
However, this distinction between self-policing and self-reporting has not
always been observed in the literature; in particular, the term self-reporting
is often used to describe self-policing.11
(Nov. 8, 1985). A number of public comments on the EPA's guidance document stated that EPA was
not doing enough to assuage corporate concerns that audit reports could be used for compliance "witch
hunts." However, EPA has consistently refused to grant explicit privilege to audit reports. See
Environmental Auditing Policy Statement: Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (July 9, 1986);
Audit Policy, supra note 1; Dan J. Jordanger & Christopher R. Graham Protecting Privilege,
Recognizing the Risks of"Criminal Liability, and Reaping the Benefits of EPA's Audit Policy, 12 VA.
LAW. 12, 15 (1991) (discussing the limitations of the Audit Policy and risks involved with its use).
9. See EPA Administered Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System,
40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (j)-(i) (2002) (describing the self-reporting required under the Clean Water Act).
10. See Jon D. Harford, SelflReporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior Under lmperfectly
Enforceable Regulations, 14 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT., 293 (1987); Arun S. Malik, Sell Reporting and
the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT., 241 (1993).
Both articles define self-reporting as a situation in which a regulated entity provides authorities with
information about its conduct, both positive and negative.
11. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of
Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON., 583, 583-84 (1994) (using the term self-reporting to denote what this
paper terms self-policing, that is the "reporting by parties of their own harm-producing actions to an
enforcement authority"); Robert limes, Remediation and SelflReporting in Optimal Law Enforcement,
72 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (1999) [hereinafter Innes, Remediation and Sel(-Reporting] (generally following
Kaplow & Shavell's definition of self-reporting).
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A number of theoretical papers have examined the concept of voluntary
self-policing in the context of environmental regulation. Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell present a model of a probabilistic environmental
enforcement regime with self-policing in their 1994 article. 12 In this model,
when self-policers pay a fine equal to the certainty equivalent of the
sanction they would face if they did not disclose but instead took their
chances that the violation would be discovered, self-policing will not affect
deterrence and will result in a welfare improvement because enforcement
effort and risk are reduced. 13 Robert Innes extends this model in a 1999
article by considering the potential benefits of remediation under a selfpolicing policy. 14 Because self-policers remediate with certainty while nondisclosers only remediate when caught, self-policing can be welfare
enhancing even if enforcement costs are not reduced. 15 In a later article
Innes modifies the model to show that self-policing can increase efficiency
if violators have different probabilities of apprehension by inducing16
violators with high probabilities of apprehension to self-police.
Additionally, in a subsequent article Innes shows that if violators can
engage in avoidance activities, self-policing can increase efficiency by
reducing such activities and, in turn, allow the government to achieve the
same level of deterrence with a reduced enforcement effort. 17
Birendra Mishra, Paul Newman, and Christopher Stinson provide an
explicit model of EPA's Audit policy. 18 They construct a single-period
compliance model and consider the effects of audit privilege and penalty
reductions for disclosure on the facility's decision to conduct an audit. In
this model, however, compliance is exogenous. 19 Thus while facilities
continue to violate, the Audit Policy will induce some to undertake audits
and correct their violations more quickly thereby reducing the duration of

12. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 11, at 583-84.
13. Jd.
14. See Innes, Remediation and Self Reporting,supra note 11.
15. Jd. at 382.
16. See Robert Innes, Self' Reporting in Optimal Law Enfbrcement When Violators Have
Heterogeneous Probabilitieso'Apprehension, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (2000). In this model because
only some violators self-police the government can tailor penalties based on violator type. In particular,

the government can set a penalty closer to the maximal sanction without overpenalizing violators with
high probabilities of apprehension.
17. See Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self Reporting in Optimal Law
Enlbrcement 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 239 (2001). In this model, since avoidance activities are reduced

the cost of increasing penalty levels is reduced and thus the government can substitute higher penalties
for lower enforcement effort.
18. Birendra K. Mishra, D. Paul Newman & Christopher H. Stinson, Environmental
Regulations and Incentives for Compliance Audits, 16 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 187 (1997).
19. Jd. at 191.
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noncompliance. 20 Alexander Pfaff and Chris Sanchirico also incorporate
exogenous compliance into their model of EPA's Audit Policy. 21 In their
model, the social cost of violations is minimized when actual fines are
conditioned on the level of self-policing.
Given that investigative effort
can not be observed, the authors compare the information requirements and
efficiency benefits of self-policing policies based on different observable
proxies for self-investigation.
Although EPA's Audit Policy was established in 1996, to date there has
not been much empirical analysis of the policy or its effect on compliance.
EPA's Office of Regulatory Enforcement publishes an Audit Policy Update
on an annual basis, but the newsletter does not include any statistical or
econometric analyses. 23 In 1999, EPA completed an Audit Policy
Evaluation based on a voluntary survey of companies that disclosed
environmental violations under policy, but the analysis is limited primarily
to descriptive statistics about the users. 24 Pfaff and Sanchirico did conduct
a statistical analysis of Audit docket cases for 1994 to 1999.25 They
compare the profile of disclosed violations to all violations in terms of the
statutes violated, types of violations, and average fines. They find that the
typical disclosed violation is relatively minor such as the failure to submit a
required report to EPA. 26 Given their findings about the types of violations
disclosed under the Audit Policy, the authors develop a number of possible
explanations about the effect of the Audit Policy on compliance behavior.
However, they do not empirically analyze the effect of the policy on
compliance behavior.

20. Id. at 206.
21. Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the
Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correctionof Environmental Harm, 16 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 189
(2000) (noting that in this context, self-policing is the investigative efforts made by firms to discover

violations).
22. Id. at 207.
23. See Environmental
Protection
Agency, Audit Policy
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/newsletters/auditupdate/index.html

Update, available at
(last visited Jan. 20,

2005).
24. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of
Violations Proposed Revisions and Request for Public Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,745 (May 17, 1999).
25.
Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes; An Empirical
Assessment of EPA's Self-Audit Policy, 23 J.Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 415 (2004).
26. See id. at 418. Although a reporting violation could be significant if it concerns a large
quantity of toxic substances whose safe use requires notification of local officials, Pfaff and Sanchirico

use the fines imposed for such violations (prior to any reduction under the Audit Policy) as a proxy for
violation severity and find that self-audited, self-reported violations are less significant than violations
discovered by the EPA. d.
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III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-POLICING

Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), EPA has developed regulations governing the storage, transport,
treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste.

7

Compliance with hazardous

waste regulations includes: building, operating, and maintaining storage,
treatment, and disposal systems in accordance with requirements; 28
obtaining the necessary permits for such systems; treating, disposing, or
29
sending waste off-site for management within certain time frames;
packaging and labeling waste appropriately; instituting good housekeeping
practices; keeping records of waste generation and management; 30 reporting
quantities and types of wastes generated, managed, and sent off site; and
training personnel both in day-to-day operations and for emergencies. 31
Hazardous waste violations may be willful or inadvertent. A facility may
knowingly violate the regulations, for example, by sending hazardous waste
to a non-hazardous waste landfill for disposal to save money. A facility
may unknowingly violate hazardous waste regulations if it does not know
that one of the waste products it generates is considered hazardous waste.
Ignorance of the law can be seen as a failure to adequately research
applicable regulations or train personnel about regulatory requirements.
Both types of violations occur because the facility did not adequately invest
in compliance. The cost of compliance, including information costs, will
vary across facilities depending on the amount and type of waste generated,
whether a facility manages its waste on site or sends it off site for
management, and the presence of state and federal regulations.32
First, consider a facility's compliance decision prior to the
implementation of a self-policing policy. To simplify the model, assume
that facilities make a discrete choice to comply or not comply with
hazardous waste regulations.3 3 Let p be the probability that the facility
27. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(c) (1976).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (a) (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1976).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (s), (r) (1976).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 262-265.
32. For example, in 2001 EPA added two inorganic chemicals to the list of regulated hazardous
wastes (Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste: Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing Wastes;
Land Disposal Restrictions for Newly Identified Wastes; and CERCLA Hazardous Substance
Designation and Reportable Quantities-Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,257 (Nov. 20, 2001)). In the
economic analysis that accompanied the final rule, EPA estimated the annual costs of compliance to
vary from $736 to $156,842 depending on the type of waste generated and the method used to treat the
waste (see Economic Analysis for Listing of Inorganic Chemicals, Notice of Final Rulemaking (2001),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/id/inorchem/pdfs/final-ea.pdf).
33. In reality, firms make a continuous choice about how much to invest in compliance with
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violates the regulations, given that the facility chooses not to comply. For
willful violations, p will be equal to unity, while for inadvertent violations p
will be less than one. Let s be the probability that regulators inspect the
facility and discover the violation. Finally, let F be the fine associated with
the violation. A facility compares the cost of compliance, C, with the
34
expected cost of noncompliance, psF, and will comply when C<psF.
If
psF<C, the facility will not comply. As discussed above, the cost of
compliance will vary across facilities. The probability of inspection, s, is
also facility-specific as EPA targets facilities based on human health and
environmental risks and past compliance history.35 Finally, F could also be
facility-specific if the penalty depends on the economic benefit gained
through noncompliance or compliance history, as many of EPA's penalty
policy guidelines suggest.36 Because C, s, and F vary across facilities, we
should expect to see some facilities in compliance and others not.
Next, consider a self-policing policy whereby facilities that perform
environmental audits and disclose any discovered violations receive a
reduced fine, R. Under this policy, facilities have three decisions to make:
(1) whether to comply: (2) whether to audit: and (3) whether to disclose any
discovered violations. Let A be the cost of the audit program.37 Figure 1
shows the facility's decision tree with the associated cost of each outcome.
Working from the last decision, the disclosure decision, a facility will
disclose discovered violations if R<sF and will not if sF<R. If a facility is
not going to disclose, it will not conduct an audit. Thus, facilities will only
audit if R<sF and A+pR<psF. Those facilities that would audit and
disclose will choose to comply instead if C<A+pR. Those facilities that
would not audit will comply only if C<psF.
Table 1 summarizes the effect of this type of self-policing policy on
compliance, audit implementation, and disclosure.
Note that the policy
the probability of a violation decreasing in the level of investment.

34. This assumes that detection is complete. Allowing for incomplete detection will not affect
the results of the model, just the interpretation of s. Under incomplete detection, s (probability of an
inspection) x (probability of detection given an inspection).
35. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement: Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004
(July 9, 1986) (stating that "EPA will continue to address environmental problems on a priority basis
and will consequently inspect facilities with poor environmental records and practices more
frequently."). While EPA's targeting policy is no longer made this explicit, it continues to be an integral
part of the enforcement strategy. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Fiscal Year 2002
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Report (2003), availableat http://www.epa.gov/compliance/re

sources/reports/accomplishments/oeca/fy02accomplishment.pdf ("An integrated approach considers the
appropriate tools to use when addressing environmental problems, and uses data analysis and other
relevant information to marshal and leverage resources to target significant non compliance.").
36. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA Civil Penalty Policy (June
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf.
37. A is the cost of implementing the audit net of any benefits other than the penalty reduction.

Does Self-Policing Help the Environment?

will decrease compliance at facilities where A+pR<C<psF. However,
these facilities will audit and disclose. Additionally, facilities where
A+pR<psF<C will begin to audit and disclose, saving enforcement
resources and increasing the level of remediation. However, without an
accompanying change in the likelihood of an inspection or the size of fines,
such a policy cannot increase initial compliance as the only effect it can
have is to reduce the expected cost of non-compliance. 38 If the self-policing
policy requires that disclosed violations be remediated as a condition for
receiving the reduced fine, as the EPA Audit Policy does, such a policy can
increase environmental protection even though it does not increase
compliance.3 9 If there is such a requirement, the reduced fine, R, would
reflect both the penalty paid to the regulatory agency as well as the costs of
remediating the violation. Similarly, F, the initial fine, would include both
monetary penalties and the cost of remediation, as the facility also must
remediate detected violations.
FIGURE 1: FACILITY'S DECISION UNDER THE AUDIT POLICY
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If violations are inadvertent, presumably conducting an environmental
38. Other models do examine the optimal combination of self-policing policies, fine levels, and
enforcement effort. See Innes, supra note 17.
39. Because facilities where A+pR < C will begin to audit, remediate, and self-disclose, the

level of environmental protection will increase. For the remediation requirements of the Audit Policy,
see 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711 (stating that the violation must be remediated for a facility to be eligible for a
penalty reduction). Moreover, EPA's Audit Policy requires that if a facility benefits economically from

the violation, the reduced fine must be at least equal to the amount of economic benefit. 60 Fed. Reg. at
66,712. For example, if a facility reports in 2000 that it did not perform daily sampling for a period of

time in 1999, it is not feasible for the facility to go back in time and perform the sampling. Any
economic benefit resulting from this violation, i.e., the savings from not sampling, must be paid under
the Audit Policy, although any additional fines above that amount could be forgiven. Id.
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audit is necessary to discover that a violation has occurred. However, if a
violation is willful, the facility need not conduct an environmental audit to
discover it. In such a situation, the cost of the environmental audit, A, is
zero. 40 Additionally, for willful violations p = 1. Consider the self-policing
policy under these conditions. If sF<R, the facility has no incentive to
disclose violations and compliance will depend on whether C<sF. If R<sF,
the facility will self-disclose if it chooses not to comply, that is if R<C.
However, if R includes the cost of remediating the violation, it is unlikely
that R<C. Thus, without a change in either s or F, the policy will not have
any significant effect on willful violations.
If the self-policing policy were combined with a redistribution of
enforcement effort, the policy could increase environmental protection as
long as remediation of a violation is as environmentally protective as
compliance. 4 ' Without the policy, facilities comply only if C<psF and
remediate when a violation is detected during an inspection. Under the
policy, facilities will comply or self-police as long as A+pR<psF. Consider
a facility where A+pR<C<psF. Under the policy, this facility will selfpolice. Therefore, regulators can decrease s to s' where A+pR<ps'F<C
without changing the incentives for self-policing. The regulator can then
shift enforcement resources to deliberate violators or facilities that
otherwise would not self-police, increasing deterrence and/or detection at
such facilities. Thus, a self-policing policy complemented by a change in
inspection targeting can result in an increase in compliance.
IV. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Ideally, an empirical analysis of EPA's Audit Policy would examine the
effect of the policy on self-policing, auditing, and compliance.
Unfortunately, the data required to conduct such a comprehensive analysis
is not available. First, because facilities do not need to inform the EPA of
their audit program in advance, there is no comprehensive data on facilities
that have implemented an audit program.42 Second, complete data on
40. However, if an environmental audit is required to receive the penalty reduction, the facility
may still have to conduct one. EPA's Audit Policy requires an environmental audit only for complete
reduction of the initial fine. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711. If an audit is not the source of the discovery,
the facility is only eligible for a 75% reduction. Id.
41. This assumes that the overall level of enforcement does not change. An increase in overall
enforcement should increase environmental protection even without a self-policing policy.
42. EPA does negotiate some audit agreements in advance. These are generally for companies
with multiple facilities and allow for disclosure of violations beyond the 21 -day disclosure requirement
for single-facility disclosures. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Use of Corporate
Auditing Agreements for Audit Policy Disclosures, available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resourc
es/policies/civil/rcra/corpaudagree-mem.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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facilities that self-police is not available. EPA is only required to make data
on settled cases available in the Audit Policy docket. 43 Because cases may
not be settled for several years after the violation is disclosed, there can be a
significant lag between the act of self-policing and the data being publicly
available. Finally, if regulators decide not to pursue a case because it would
receive complete penalty mitigation under the Audit Policy, the case may
not be placed in the docket. For example, EPA Region 5 (covering Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin) lists thirty-one selfdisclosure cases on its website, but only 7 of these are in the Audit Policy
docket. 44 Since comprehensive data on auditing and self-policing is not
available, this paper uses data on detected hazardous waste violations to
assess the effect of EPA's Audit policy on hazardous waste compliance.
Additionally, the analysis examines the impact of state audit policies on
compliance since many states have recently enacted environmental audit
privilege or immunity laws.4 5

The universe for this analysis includes all large quantity hazardous
waste generators and management facilities in the continental U.S.,
excluding newly regulated facilities and federal facilities. 46 Newly
regulated facilities are excluded because they are likely to behave
differently than established companies as they have less knowledge about
the regulations and the best way in which to comply. 47 Federal facilities are
excluded because the impact of penalties on federal facilities is not the same
as the impact on for-profit companies.4 8 Finally, small quantity generators
43. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
44. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGION 5, Region 5 Audit Policy Cases,
available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/r5cases.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). The Audit Docket
(#C-94-001) can be obtained from EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Docket and Information Center,
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
Audit cases are indexed in section VII-B Nine of the 31 cases were resolved by letter and no formal
compliant was filed or violations pursued because the facilities satisfied all of the criteria for the Audit
Policy.
45. Some state laws prevent state enforcement authorities from obtaining audit data. Some
shield companies from liability if they disclose and correct violations discovered through an
environmental audit. EPA policy is generally less favorable to industry than much state privilege and
immunity legislation. See generallv John A. Lee & Bertram C. Frey, Environmental Audit Immunity
Laws: A State-by State Comparison, ENVTL. REP. (BNA), July 9, 2004, at S-3.
46. Some state data are not available for Alaska and Hawaii. Because there are only nineteen
facilities in these states that would otherwise be included in the analysis, the author omitted these
facilities from the universe.
47. See John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are
Violators Ignorant, or Evasive ot'the Law? 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444 (1996) (finding that facilities that are
more likely to be ignorant of regulatory requirements are also more likely to be in noncompliance).
48. See S.G. Badrinath & Paul J. Bolster, The Role of Market Forces in EPA Enforcement
Activity, 10 J. REG. ECON. 165 (1996) (finding that firm value declines in response to EPA enforcement
actions).
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are not included because the regulations governing them are significantly
more lenient than those governing other generators and because they are
excluded from some EPA data collection efforts. 49 Approximately 9,500
facilities are included in the panel data set that covers the period from 1992
to 2001.50 The panel begins in 1992 because the last major changes to
hazardous waste regulations, the Toxicity Characteristics Rule and the Land
Disposal Restrictions, were in effect by 1992. 5l
a. Inspection TargetingAnalysis

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the probability of
inspection for facilities in the analysis has changed since the Audit Policy
was enacted. Data on facility inspections is maintained in EPA's RCRA
Info database, which includes information on the date of each inspection
visit and the types of inspections conducted.52 Figure 2 shows the total
number of RCRA inspections conducted each year during the period of
analysis. Although it appears that the total number of inspections held
steady and then decreased after the establishment of the Audit Policy in
1996, one cannot necessarily conclude that the probability of an inspection
decreased at the facilities in this analysis. For example, inspections might
have decreased because the number of regulated facilities decreased.
Conducting a probit regression on the probability that a facility would be
inspected in a given year allows one to identify the factors that affect
whether a facility is inspected and to determine whether inspection targeting
changed systematically after the imposition of the Audit Policy. 53 Because
the panel data set contains ten observations for each facility, standard errors
are clustered by facility.

49.

lit

See U.S,

Environmental Protection Agency, RCRA

Orientation Manual, Section 111,
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FIGURE

2: RCRA INSPECTIONS AND VIOLATIONS, 1992 - 2001

As shown in Table 2, the regression includes both facility-level and
state-level variables. Additionally, the regression includes state dummies
which are not shown in the table. 54 Over two-thirds of the state dummies
are individually significant and all are jointly significant. This indicates
variation across the states in the probability of inspection, as one would
expect given that most states run their own hazardous waste program.55 The
first five explanatory variables listed in Table 2 characterize the level and
nature of hazardous waste activities at the facility: Permit indicates whether
the facility has a RCRA operating permit; Generated and Received measure
the quantity of hazardous waste generated at the facility and the quantity
received at the facility for management, respectively; and Combustion and
Land indicate whether the facility operates a hazardous waste combustion
unit (e.g., an incinerator or industrial furnace) or land disposal unit (e.g.,
landfill or surface impoundment), respectively.56 Because there is more
potential for environmental damages at facilities that manage large
quantities of waste or conduct certain types of management operations,
enforcement authorities are likely to target facilities based on hazardous
waste activity, as is shown by the positive and significant coefficients on all
of these variables.
TABLE 2: PROBIT RESULTS FOR INSPECTION EQUATION
Explanatory Variable
Coefficient
Standard Error

Constant
Permit
Generated
Received
Combustion

-1.80**
0.57**
0.04**
0.03**
0.18**

(0.11)
(0.03)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.06)

54. Complete results are available from the author upon request.
55. EPA will authorize a state to run its own hazardous waste program as long as the state's
program is at least as stringent as the federal program. See RCRA State Authorization, available at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/index.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). Authorized states
implement and enforce their hazardous waste program, while EPA, thorough its regional offices,

implements and enforces federal regulations in unauthorized states.
56. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Biennial Reporting System (BRS),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/data/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). The BRS contains

information on the amount and type of waste generated and the waste management systems used at the
facility. The data are collected biennially for the odd years, so waste quantities for even years are
interpolated. Additionally, due to the time lag between collection and dissemination of the data, 2001
quantity data is not yet available. Thus 1999 data has been used for both 2000 and 2001. The results of
analysis with respect to the audit and self-policing variables do not change qualitatively if the quantity
data are excluded.
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Land

0.21**

(0.06)

5Yr Inspection History
Inspected-,
Violated-,
Audit x Permit
Audit x Generated

1.38**
-0.09**
0.17**
-0.02
-0.00001

(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.004)

Audit x Received
0.009**
(0.003)
Audit x Combustion
-0.02
(0.07)
Audit x Land
-0.23**
(0.06)
Audit x 5Yr Inspection History
-0.02
(0.04)
Audit x Inspected-,
-0.10"*
(0.03)
Audit x Violated-,
-0.07*
(0.03)
State Inspections
0.34**
(0.24)
State Inspection Intensity
0.26**
(0.04)
State Violations-,
-0.09**
(0.03)
State Gross Product
-0.49**
(0.11)
State Compliance Cost
0.35**
(0.09)
State Strict Liability
0.03
(0.02)
State Environmental Membership
0.02**
(0.01)
State Pollution Prevention
-0.03
(0.03)
State Privilege
-0.10"*
(0.03)
State Immunity
0.13**
(0.03)
State Self-Police
-0.30**
(0.02)
Audit Policy
0.46**
(0.07)
Audit x Region 1
-0.40**
(0.07)
Audit x Region 2
-0.32**
(0.07)
Audit x Region 3
-0.06
(0.06)
Audit x Region 4
-0.32**
(0.06)
Audit x Region 5
-0.28**
(0.06)
Audit x Region 6
-0.35**
(0.07)
Audit x Region 7
-0.26**
(0.07)
Audit x Region 8
-0.20**
(0.09)
Audit x Region 9
-0.76**
(0.07)
**Statistically significant at 5%, *Statistically significant at 10%.
State dummies are not reported.
The next three variables listed in Table 2 describe the facility's
enforcement and compliance history. The 5Yr Inspection History indicates
the percentage of the past 5 years in which the facility has had a least one
inspection visit; InspectedI indicates whether the facility was inspected in
the previous year; and Violated-1 indicates whether the facility had a
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detected violation in the previous year. The coefficient on 5Yr Inspection
History is positive and significant while the coefficient on InspectedI is
negative and significant. Thus, there appears to be an unobserved or
omitted characteristic of the facility that the enforcement agency is
targeting, such as specific activities or substances, that make the facility
more likely to be inspected. Generally, if a facility was inspected in the
previous year, a facility is less likely to be inspected in the current year. As
one would expect, however, facilities that were found in violation in the
previous year are significantly more likely to be inspected in the current
year.
The facility-specific variables are also interacted with a binary Audit
variable that indicates whether the observation took place before or after the
establishment of the Audit Policy. As shown in Table 2, half of these
interactions have significant coefficients. This indicates that after the
imposition of the Audit Policy, facilities that receive waste from off-site for
management are targeted more intensely, while land disposal facilities are
targeted less intensely. In addition, facilities that were inspected in the
previous year and facilities that were found in violation of hazardous waste
regulations in the previous year are targeted less intensely after the
imposition of the Audit Policy.
State-specific variables are included in the equation to control for
differences in state enforcement.
The first three state-level variables
measure the level of inspection and enforcement activity in the state.57
State Inspections measures the total number of inspections conducted in the
state in a given year, normalized by the gross state product, and has a
positive and significant coefficient. State Inspection Intensity is equal to
the number of inspections in a given year divided by the number of unique
facilities inspected. The higher the intensity, the more likely that the state
conducts multiple inspections at a single facility. Since the facilities
included in this analysis are only a fraction of the facilities regulated by the
EPA under RCRA, this positive and significant coefficient on State
Inspection Intensity suggests that states with higher intensities are more
likely to target large quantity generators and management facilities. State
Violations-1 measures the total number of violations detected in the state in
the previous year, normalized by the State Gross Product. The coefficient
is negative and significant, which would be consistent with past violations
diverting inspection resources for follow up inspections.
State Gross Product is included as a proxy for the enforcement burden

57. These variables include all inspections and enforcement activity in the state, not just the
activity at facilities in this analysis.
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that a state's environmental agency faces. 58 The coefficient on State Gross
Product is negative and significant, as expected, because states with a
higher workload possess fewer resources to inspect the facilities in this
analysis. Additionally, states with heavier workloads may be forced to
target enforcement efforts which will result in unevenly distributed
inspections. State Compliance Cost is an index of average pollution
abatement costs across all media.59 Compliance costs can be used to
measure the stringency of state environmental regulation as more stringent
regulation would result in higher pollution abatement costs. The coefficient
is positive and significant, suggesting that in more stringently regulated
states the probability of inspection is higher.
A State Strict Liability dummy variable, indicating whether the state
has adopted a law to hold parties strictly liable for accidental hazardous
waste spills, is included in this analysis because strict liability will affect the
incentives for enforcement agencies to find the responsible parties. 6' As
shown in Table 2, the coefficient on State Strict Liability is positive but not
significant. To measure local enforcement pressure, the analysis also
includes State Environmental Membership, a measure of the proportion of
citizens in the state that are members in environmental organizations such
as the Sierra Club, because states with high environmental activism may
have different inspection strategies than states with less environmentallyconcerned citizens. 6 1 The coefficient on State Environmental Membership
is positive and significant. State Pollution Prevention is a dummy variable
indicating whether the state has a voluntary or mandatory pollution
prevention program in place.62
Because the primary focus of many

58. To control for the workload faced by state environmental agencies, many studies use the

level of manufacturing or number of manufacturers in a state. However, because a significant portion of
hazardous waste is produced by facilities in sectors that are not considered manufacturing (i.e., service
sectors), this analysis uses the state's gross product. Gross State Product data was obtained from the

Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce website, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/r
egional/gsp.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
59.

See ARIK

LEVINSON,

AN

INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED

INDEX

OF

STATE ENVIRONMENTAL

COMPLIANCE COSTS, IN BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (G.

Metcalf & C. Carrero eds., 2001). Arik Levinson calculated this index by adjusting survey data on
pollution abatement costs and expenditures ("PACE") to account for state differences in industrial
composition. Because the PACE survey was discontinued from 1995 to 1999, 1994 values are used in
this analysis.
60.

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW

INSTITUTE,

RESEARCH

REPORT

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

STATE

SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE STUDY, 1998 UPDATE (1998) (source for the data on strict liability

adoption).
61.

BOB HALL & MARY LEE KERR, 1991-1992 GREEN INDEX: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO

THE NATION'S ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 116 (1991).
62. Data on pollution prevention programs was obtained from the National Pollution
Prevention Roundtable, Washington, D.C.
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pollution prevention programs is facility education and guidance, this
variable is used as a proxy for state outreach efforts.6 3 However, as shown
in Table 2, the coefficient on this variable is not significant.
By 2001, half of the states had some type of self-policing or audit
policy in place.64 To control for differences in these state policies, the
analysis also includes the dummy variables State Privilege,State Immunity,
and State Self-Police.6 5 Respectively, for each year these variables measure
whether the state considers environmental audit results to be privileged;
whether the state grants immunity from penalties for violations disclosed as
a result of the audit; and whether the state has a self-disclosure policy
(which does not generally require an audit to have taken place to receive
relief). The coefficient on State Privilege is negative and significant while
the coefficient on State Immunity is positive and significant. Because only
one state has Immunity and not Privilege, in general the net effect of audit
immunity is positive, indicating a higher probability of inspection. 6
However, in states with audit privilege only (and not reduced penalties), the
probability of inspection decreases. The coefficient on State Self-Police is
negative and significant, suggesting that state self-policing statutes may be
used as a substitute for inspections.
Finally, the probit equation also includes a dummy variable indicating
whether the federal Audit Policy is effective for that year and whether
interactions exist between the Audit variable and Regional dummies.6 7 The
coefficient on the Audit variable is positive and significant, while the
coefficients for all the regional interactions are negative (and significant for
all but Region 3). For the two western regions, Regions 9 and 10 (the
omitted region), the net effect is negative; for all other regions, the net
63. See generally National Pollution Prevention Roundtable, An Ounce of Pollution Prevention
is Worth Over 167 Billion Pounds of Care (Jan. 2003).
64. Bertram and Frey, supra note 45.
65. See
National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures
Data
available
at

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/esnr/audits.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) (discussing data from all state
policies through 1998); see also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Region Five Office of
Regional Counsel Data available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/audits/ audit-apil.htm (last visited

Jan. 20, 2005) (discussing Region Five's programs through 2001). These data were supplemented with
information collected from state statutes and websites.
66. Only Rhode Island grants immunity from penalties disclosed as a result of an audit but does
not consider the audit to be privileged. Additionally, three states (Nebraska, South Dakota, and Utah)
passed Immunity regulation prior to passing Privilege legislation. Five states (Arkansas, Indiana,
Illinois, Mississippi, and Oregon) have only Privilege legislation. See State Audit Privilege and
Immunity Laws, available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/audits/audit apil.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2005).
67. The Audit variable was not interacted with state dummies because the federal Audit Policy
appears to be implemented either at the regional or federal level, depending on the case, rather than at
the state level.
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effect is positive. Thus, there appears to be significant variation in Audit
Policy implementation across regions.
b.

ComplianceAnalysis

The next step in the analysis is to determine the effect that the Audit
Policy has had on hazardous waste compliance, both directly and through
changes in inspection targeting. Because of the complexity of hazardous
waste regulations, there is no simple measure of compliance. There are
approximately forty "areas of violation" which roughly correspond to the
subparts of the Code of Federal Regulations for hazardous waste. 68 Within
each area, there are numerous specific violations that could occur.
Moreover, the severity of each violation can vary. Thus, for the purposes of
this analysis, a facility is considered out of compliance if it commits at least
one violation. Specifically, the dependent variable in the analysis is a
binary variable equal to one if there is any detected RCRA violation at the
facility during the calendar year. This does not include any violations that
are disclosed under the Audit Policy, only violations detected as the result
of a state or federal inspection. 69 Therefore, if a facility is not inspected
there is no data on whether the facility is in compliance. Thus, any
empirical analysis of compliance must control for this censoring of data by
using data on whether or not a facility has been inspected. In addition, a
regulator's decision to inspect a particular facility depends in part on the
likelihood that the facility will be noncompliant and the facility's decision to
comply depends in part on the likelihood of inspection. The censored
bivariate probit model developed by William Greene accounts for both of
these factors. 70 The censored bivariate probit uses maximum likelihood to
estimate a probit model with sample selection where the selection equation
and the underlying equation of interest may have correlated errors.
Table 3 presents the results of the censored bivariate probit. As in the
inspection analysis, standard errors are clustered by facility. The results for
the inspection equation are almost identical to the results of the inspection
probit shown in Table 2. The only qualitative difference is that the
coefficient on strict liability becomes significant in this model. Note also
68. 40 C.F.R. § 262-265. For example, a facility may violate the manifest requirements
applicable to generators (§262.21-23) or the packaging requirements applicable to generators (§262.30)
or the contingency plan requirements applicable to treatment, storage, or disposal facilities (§264.52-56).
69. Although a few disclosed violations may have inadvertently been included in EPA's
hazardous waste database, RCRAInfo, an analysis of the Audit docket shows that the majority of
disclosed RCRA violations are not recorded.
70. WILLIAM H. GREENE, A STATISTICAL MODEL FOR CREDIT SCORING, (N.Y.U. Dept. Econ.
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. EC-92-29, 1992).
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that the correlation coefficient for the two equations, p, is positive and
significant. Thus, the assumption that the errors in the two equations are
correlated is correct.
TABLE

3: CENSORED

BIVARIATE PROBIT RESULTS

Explanatory Variable

Inspection Equation
Coefficient Standard
Error

Violation Equation
Coefficient
Standard
Error

Constant
Permit
Generated
Received
Combustion
Land
5Yr Inspection History
Inspected-1
Violated-,
Audit x Permit
Audit x Generated
Audit x Received
Audit x Combustion
Audit x Land
Audit x 5Yr Inspection
History

-2.86**
0.56**
0.04**
0.03**
0.19**
0.21**
1.38**
-0.09**
0.19**
-0.02
-0.0005
0.01**
-0.05
-0.22**
-0.01

(0.11)
(0.03)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.04)

-2.04**
0.37**
0.03**
0.02**
0.26**
-0.02
0.64**
-0.38**
0.27**
-0.10"*
-0.001
0.01**
-0.04
-0.08
0.01

(0.15)
(0.03)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.05)

Audit x Inspected-,

-0.11 **

(0.03)

-0.11 **

(0.04)

Audit x Violated-,
State Inspections
State Inspection Intensity
State Violations-,
State Gross Product
State Compliance Cost
State Management Options
State Strict Liability
State
Environmental
Membership
State Pollution Prevention
State Privilege
State Immunity
State Self-Police
Audit Policy
Audit x Region 1

-0.06*
0.32**
0.26**
-0.12**
-0.47**
0.40**

(0.03)
(0.20)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.11)
(0.09)

-0.02
0.03*
0.42**

(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.05)

0.04*
0.02**

(0.02)
(0.01)

-0.96**
0.23**
-0.005**
0.06*
0.03**

(0.15)
(0.11)
(0.001)
(0.02)
(0.01)

-0.02
-0.10"*
0.13**
-0.30**
0.47**
-0.40**

(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.07)

-0.01
-0.13**
0.06**
-0.21**
0.02
-0.06

(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.10)
(0.10)
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Audit x Region 2
-0.32**
(0.07)
-0.12
Audit x Region 3
-0.06
(0.06)
0.01
Audit x Region 4
-0.33**
(0.06)
-0.01
Audit x Region 5
-0.29**
(0.06)
0.05
Audit x Region 6
-0.35**
(0.07)
-0.02
Audit x Region 7
-0.26**
(0.07)
0.01
Audit x Region 8
-0.20**
(0.09)
0.23**
Audit x Region 9
-0.77**
(0.07)
-0.44**
P
0.84**
(0.03)
**Statistically significant at 5%, *Statistically significant at 10%.
State dummies are not reported.

(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.10)

Now consider the results for the violation equation. Except for the
coefficient on Land, all of the non-interacted facility-specific coefficients
are significant. The positive coefficients on Permit, Generated, Received,
and Combustion suggest that the increased costs of compliance for
permitted facilities, facilities that generate or receive large quantities of
waste, and facilities with combustion units, outweigh the increased
probability that the facility will be inspected. The coefficients on 5Yr
Inspection History are also positive and significant in both equations. Thus,
even though facilities with many inspections in the past are more likely to
be inspected in the current year, these facilities are also more likely to be
found in violation. This suggests that there may be unobserved or omitted
characteristics of the facility that the enforcement agency targets that also
make the facility more likely to violate. However, the coefficient on
Inspected in the violation equation is negative and significant, perhaps
because facilities that were inspected in the previous year believed that they
were more likely to be inspected in the current year.
Table 3 indicates that facilities that were found in violation in the
previous year also are more likely to violate in the current year. This result
seems to be inconsistent with the fact that repeat violators experience a
higher probability of inspection in the following year and face increased
penalties for repeat violations; however, in many cases it will take time to
correct a violation, particularly if it requires installing new technology, so
past violations may determine current violations. Of the facility-level
variables interacted with the Audit dummy variable, only three have
significant coefficients. After the imposition of the Audit Policy, permitted
facilities are less likely to violate; facilities that receive waste from off-site
are more likely to violate. Facilities that were inspected in the previous
year are also less likely to violate after the imposition of the Audit Policy.
As in the Inspection probit, state dummies were included in the
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censored bivariate probit, although they are not reported in Table 3. In both
equations, over two-thirds of the state dummies are individually significant,
and all are jointly-significant. The coefficients on State Inspections and
State Inspection Intensity in the Violation Equation are both positive and
significant, which appears inconsistent with the positive coefficients in the
Inspection equation. However, if the same facilities violate regulations
repeatedly, the number of inspections and intensity of inspections may
reflect higher levels of past violations. Although the number of violations
in the state in a previous year should affect the probability that an
inspection will be conducted in the current year, to identify the model State
Violations-I is not included in the Violation Equation because data on the
level of violations will not generally be common knowledge to facilities and
therefore should not affect the facility's decision to violate.
The coefficient on State Gross Product in the Violation Equation is
negative and significant, which appears to be inconsistent with the negative
coefficient in the Inspection Equation. However, states with high gross
products are larger and more industrialized thus are likely to have relatively
well established environmental programs, which could result in higher
compliance levels. As expected, the coefficient on State Compliance Cost
is positive and significant, as facilities with higher compliance costs have a
higher incentive to violate the regulations. State Management Options is a
variable that measures the number of commercial hazardous waste
management facilities in the state.
To identify the model, State
Management Options is omitted from the Inspection Equation because there
is no obvious relationship between the number of commercial waste
managers and the probability of inspection for a facility. Moreover, when
State Management Options was

included

in the

Inspection probit

regression, it was not significant.
In the Violation Equation, State
Management Options has a negative and significant coefficient. When
there are more hazardous waste managers in a state, a facility has a greater
opportunity to send waste off-site for commercial management than manage
the waste on site.
The coefficient on Strict Liability in the Violation Equation is positive
and significant, which is consistent with Anna Alberini and David Austin's
finding that states with large numbers of toxic releases (spills) are more
likely to adopt strict liability.7 1 The coefficient on Environmental
Membership is also positive and significant though inconsistent with what
one might expect, given that James Hamilton finds that penalties are higher
71. Anna Alberini & David H. Austin, Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and
Toxic Pollution Releases, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 729 (2002) reprinted in RESOURCES FOR FUTURE, 3
(2001) available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-01 -06.pdf
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in states where a larger percentage of citizens are members in
As in the Inspection Equation, the
environmental organizations. 72
coefficient on State PollutionPrevention is not significant.

The coefficients on State Privilege are negative and significant in both
equations, while the coefficients on State Immunity are positive and
significant.
However, as only Rhode Island has Immunity and not
Privilege, the net effect of state audit policies on inspections is generally
positive (i.e. a higher probability of inspection), while the net effect on
compliance is generally negative.73 This suggests that state audit policies
shift enforcement resources and thus increase compliance. For states with
privilege alone, the effect on compliance is positive (fewer violations) even
though the probability of an inspection is also low. This suggests that
providing privilege may yield incentives for firms to implement audit
programs that could decrease violations. The coefficients on State SelfPolicing are negative and significant in both equations. Thus, it appears
that state self-policing statutes may be an effective substitute for direct
enforcement (i.e. inspections). Finally, consider the results for the federal
Audit Policy. In the Violation Equation, the coefficient on Audit is not
significant, neither are most of the coefficients on the interactions between
the Audit variable and Regional dummies. As shown in Table 3, the Audit
Policy has only significantly affected compliance in Regions 8 and 9.
However, in Region 8 the effect is positive, while in Region 9 the effect is
negative.
To better understand the effect the federal and state audit policies have
on the probability of inspections and violations, Table 4 reports the
estimated change in the probability of a representative facility being
inspected or violating the regulations under various regimes.
This
representative facility has the mean values for continuous explanatory
74
variables and the median values for discrete explanatory variables.
Assuming no state or federal audit policies, the probability of an inspection
at this facility is estimated to be thirty percent and the probability of a
violation is estimated to be twenty-one percent.7 5 Imposition of the federal
Audit Policy raises the estimated probability of inspection to thirty-one

72. James T. Hamilton, Going by the (Informal) Book: The EPA's Use of lnformal Rules in

Enfbrcing Hazardous Waste Laws, 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION,
AND GROWTH 109, 114 (1996).
73. See State Audit Privilege and Immunity Laws, supra note 66.
74. Additionally, this representative facility is assumed to be located in New York (EPA

Region 1).
75. Accord Sarah L. Stafford, The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous
Waste Regulations, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 290 (2002).
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percent and decreases the probability of violation to eighteen percent. As
indicated in Table 4, if the facility were also to be located in a state with
audit privilege, the probability of inspection would fall three percentage
points to twenty-eight percent and the probability of violation would fall
three percentage points to fifteen percent. If the state had both audit
privilege and immunity, the probability of inspection would rise to thirtytwo percent and the probability of violation would rise to sixteen percent.
However, if the state had a self-policing statute, in addition to audit
privilege and immunity, the probability of inspection would fall to twentytwo percent and the probability of violation to twelve percent.
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF STATE AND FEDERAL AUDIT POLICIES ON THE
ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF INSPECTION AND VIOLATION AT A
REPRESENTATIVE FACILITY
Inspection

Violation

Probability

Probability

Representative Facility

30%

21%

Federal Audit Policy in Effect

+ 1%

- 3%

State Privilege in Effect

- 3%

- 3%

State Immunity in Effect

+ 4%

+ 1%

State Self-Policing in Effect

- 10%

- 4%

Changes are in percentage points.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis examines the effect of EPA and state self-policing
policies on hazardous waste compliance. Both federal and state policies
appear to combine changes in inspection targeting. After the passage of the
federal Audit Policy, commercial waste managers (i.e., facilities that
receive hazardous waste from off-site) are targeted more heavily, while land
disposal facilities are targeted less heavily. Additionally, facilities that were
inspected or had detected violations in the previous year, have a lower
probability of inspection under the Audit Policy. There also appear to be
significant differences in the implementation of the Audit Policy across
regions. In some regions the probability of inspection increases under the
76. This includes the estimated change in probability from both the Audit Policy dummy
variable and the Audit Policy interaction terms.
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policy, while in other regions it decreases. States that grant privilege to
audit documents, but do not provide immunity for violations disclosed as a
result of the audit, have a lower probability of inspections. Similarly, in
states with self-policing policies, the probability of inspection is lower.
Thus, both self-policing and audit privilege without immunity appear to be
used as a substitute for inspections. However, states that grant both audit
privilege and immunity have a higher probability of inspection. Since
immunity reduces the expected fine associated with a disclosed violation, a
higher probability of inspection is necessary to ensure that compliance does
not decrease.
There is little basis to argue that the federal and state policies have
decreased compliance. The only statistically significant increase in the
probability of violation occurs at facilities that receive waste for
management from off-site and at facilities in Region 8. 77 Conversely, after
the imposition of the federal Audit Policy, the probability of violation
decreases significantly at permitted facilities and all facilities in Region 9.78
Moreover, both state audit and self-policing policies appear to decrease the
probability of violation. While some increase in compliance may be
attributed to changes in inspection targeting, it also appears that compliance
increases even when the probability of inspection decreases. This suggests
facilities that audit are able to identify and correct problems before they
become violations. Ultimately, state policies have had a more significant
effect on compliance than the federal policy, perhaps because many state
policies provide privilege to audit documents, while the federal policy does
not.
While these results suggest that self-policing can help the environment,
they also underscore the need for additional theoretical and empirical
analysis of the effect of self-policing policies. In particular, analyses that
examine the effect of such policies on both the decision to implement an
audit program and the decision to self-disclose violations are critical.
Further analysis would help to more clearly determine the specific channels
through which self-policing policies affect compliance behavior. A more
thorough understanding of the effects of self-policing will help regulators
design new policies or modify existing policies to improve compliance with
environmental laws and regulations in a cost-effective manner.

77. As shown in Table 3, the only two Audit interactions with positive and significant
coefficients are Audit x Received and Audit x Region 8.

78. As shown in Table 3, the both Audit x Permit and Audit x Region 9 have negative and
significant coefficients.

